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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper analyses the effect on manufacturers in Italy’s footwear districts of 
international competition, and investigates the underresearched nature of the link 
between international competition and the internal cohesion of districts. It addresses if 
and how global competition provokes the (partial) geographic fragmentation of local 
supply chains, dislocating select local parts manufacturers in its wake. The findings 
suggest that when international competition threatens the viability of local production, 
firms with the requisite organisational capabilities delocalise parts of the value chain. 
This helps them to retain competitive advantages but it also reduces agglomeration. 
This insight should inform regional development policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Local production systems are fêted in academic research and public policy debates as 
a socially desirable and economically sustainable answer to the forces of international 
competition that raise global efficiency at times at the price of harming local welfare 
(OECD, 1999, 2000a, b; Moss Kanter, 1995; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott and 
Storper, 1992; for a general overview see also Batista, 1998; Doeringer and Terkla, 
1996; or, specifically related to developing countries, Humphrey, 1995; and Schmitz, 
2000). Italy’s industrial districts epitomise the model of such a system. Referring to 
their undisputed success in employment creation and generating exports, the Italian 
Institute of Foreign Trade, a government agency, proudly stated in a promotional 
supplement to the Economist that “it is not surprising that the clusters have attracted 
the attention of industrialists and politicians from outside Italy who are eager to learn 
the recipe of the success, as well as the interests of economists and academics” 
(Spotlighting Italy, 2000, p.28). Critics charge on the other hand that industrial district 
is a fuzzy concept and a matter of credo more than of empirical evidence (Markusen, 
1999). Its proponents (e.g. Harrison, 1992; Storper and Harrison, 1991) allegedly 
overconceptualise it and too rarely subject it to empirical testing or, as one sardonic 
observer put it, “sit around their camp fires, supposedly wild eyed with enthusiasm, 
talking … post-Fordism” (Amin, 1994, p.170). 
  
This shortcoming is the object of this paper. It analyses the effect on manufacturers 
in Italy’s footwear districts of international competition. More specifically, it 
investigates the underresearched nature of the link between international competition 
and the internal cohesion of districts (cf. Enright, 1996, p.212). In other words, do 
districts adapt collectively by coordinating responses to competition along the value 
chain or do individual, especially downstream, firms react strategically by replacing 
supply from within the district with external sources? It thus addresses if and how 
global competition provokes the (partial) geographic fragmentation of local supply 
chains, dislocating select parts manufacturers in its wake. The findings suggest that 
when international competition threatens the viability of local production, firms with 
the requisite organisational capabilities delocalise parts of the value chain. This helps 
them retain competitive advantages but it also reduces agglomeration. By making use 
of highly disaggregated, provincial trade data, the analysis demonstrates the need to 
differentiate industrial districts in terms of their adjustment capability, even in the 
same sector and market segment. This implies lessons for the design of local or 
regional industrial policy. Section 2 briefly reviews relevant literature. Section 3 
describes competition in the global and Italian footwear industries. Section 4 analyses 
the extent and impact of delocalisation tendencies of footwear districts in the 1990s. 
Section 5 concludes and suggests policy implications. 
 
 
THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 
 
Local production systems attract interest both because they have promoted regional 
development and because economic integration, along with other features of 
globalisation, may deterritorialise economic activity. The economic and social 
consequences of the latter at the local level are likely to be negative for those people 
and firms that are not mobile themselves or whose assets are viable only in the 
specific context of imperfect locational markets or who for some other reason rely on 
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the geographical proximity a cluster typically affords. However, deterritorialisation is 
not a necessary effect of economic integration. Neither the growing salience of intra-
industry trade or foreign direct investment nor global corporate networks centered 
around multinational firms indicate per se a global market place with footloose 
producers. Instead, these trends may illustrate how firms optimise access to 
territorialised production factors (Storper, 1997, Chap.7; see also Young, Hood, and 
Peters, 1994). Hence, theoretically the effect on local production systems of 
increasing competition is not clear (cf. Amin and Thrift, 1992). Empirically it is 
unlikely to be uniform because “sticky places” – above-average growth centres with 
the ability to retain mobile capital and labour – differ with respect to spatial form, 
industrial complexion, institutional configurations, and outside links. This influences 
how these places operate and how they change to outside pressure (Markusen, 1996). 
 
 The literature on Italian industrial districts does not in general pay much attention to 
if, or how, increasing international competition impacts local production systems (e.g. 
Anastasia and Corò, 1996; Becattini and Rullani, 1993; Brusco, 1993, 1996; Rullani, 
1995). Some authors assume that globalisation somehow changes the structure of 
districts without showing how and where (Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Vipraio, 1997) 
even though the preponderance of small firms in and of itself says nothing about the 
adjustment capacity of regional economies (cf. Acs, 1996). On the whole, conceptual 
work on agglomeration models is prevalent (see Paniccia, 2002, esp. Chap.1, for a 
comprehensive review of the literature and its theoretical shortcomings). Critical 
empirical analyses of how clusters work in practice in view of changed competitive 
conditions of the global economy are harder to come by (e.g. Becattini and Rullani, 
1996; for exceptions, see Amin, 1994; Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1990; Courault and 
Romani, 1992; Crestanello, 1996; Guerrieri et al., 2001; dei Ottati, 1996). The latter 
authors show that as a consequence of more global competition industrial organisation 
becomes less locally confined and also less vertically disintegrated. New sourcing 
patterns and productive decentralisation eliminate parts of the local value chain, or re-
centralisation introduces vertical hierarchies. This suggests a connection between 
changes in global production and the intra- vs extra-district division of labour. 
 
 In principle, global competition can induce changes in technology, markets, 
organisation, and strategy, thereby altering the relative costs a localised value chain 
faces. When cost considerations outweigh advantages of proximity, firms in the 
cluster can seek and realise higher-order advantages. This would upgrade the 
production capacity or technological capability of the cluster, but the structure of the 
district in terms of its user-supplier relations may well remain the same. Alternatively 
the cluster can replace high-cost inputs through cheaper imports, outsourcing or 
outward direct investment in low-cost locations, or increased capital intensity. This 
might extend the global reach of the original value chain but would reduce its local 
depth; ultimately the district in its original form would be no more. 
 
 
COMPETITION IN THE WORLD FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY 
Production and Sector Characteristics of Italian Footwear Districts 
 
Formerly dispersed artisan footwear producers started forming agglomerations around 
the mid-1970s. Because of the small-firm structure, high-flexibility operation, and 
high-quality and cost-efficient production, the ensuing local production systems are 
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almost ideal-typical districts (Ragazzi, 1992b). They exist primarily in Northeast and 
Central Italy (Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, the Marche) but also in 
the South (Campania, Apulia). Their share in regional output is generally substantial 
(see Table 1). For example, the province of Pavia, comprising the Vigevano district, 
accounts for almost 40 per cent of all firms and employees in the Lombardy region. In 
Emilia Romagna, the three footwear producing provinces (Bologna, Forlì, Ravenna) 
make up roughly 90 per cent of all firms and employees. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The manufacture of footwear is highly labour-intensive. Especially the production 
of uppers is difficult to mechanise. Other than sewing machines no technology 
currently exists that could manage both high production runs and a highly 
differentiated product portfolio, at least not for leather shoes which account for the 
bulk of footwear output in Italy. The production of a leather shoe involves from a 
minimum of 40 to as many as a few hundred stages. Hence, there are practically no 
scale economies in leather footwear though they do exist for the least differentiated 
components such as soles which is also where the highest technology input is feasible. 
Footwear is traditionally the most export-oriented of all Italian manufacturing 
industries, with exports accounting for more than 80 per cent of output in the late 
1990s (A.N.C.I., n.d., Table 6.3). Traditional production techniques, high labour 
intensity, small scale, and high levels of global trade all make the footwear sector an 
interesting case study of the link between increasing international competition and the 
structure of local production systems. 
 
 
Major Footwear Producers and Exporters in the World 
 
Italy was the world’s largest exporter of footwear until the mid-1980s, but was 
subsequently overtaken by China and Hong Kong. Asian producers hold about two 
thirds of the world footwear market, Western Europe only 10 per cent (A.N.C.I., n.d.). 
Between 1976 and 2000, footwear manufacturers from developing countries increased 
their share of EU imports at the expense of European producers. However, these still 
account for more than half of the EU market (see Table 2). The most important source 
countries are in Asia (China and Vietnam; until the 1990s South Korea and Taiwan) 
and Eastern Europe (Romania and Hungary; until the 1990s Yugoslavia). Italy’s share 
of EU imports decreased from roughly one half in 1976 to 17 per cent in 2000 but it 
still has the single largest market share. Since Western Europe has traditionally been 
Italy’s most important export market, this analysis focuses on import competition in 
the EU. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 The share of Italian footwear imports originating outside the EU is much higher 
than the EU average. Eastern Europe is by far the single most important source 
region. In 2000 leather shoes accounted for the lion share of footwear imports in both 
the EU (57%) and in Italy (41%), with components playing a large and rising role in 
Italy, too. The difference in the geographic composition of imports is even more 
pronounced here (see Table 3). Most EU imports are intra-EU trade, especially from 
Italy. By contrast, Italy imports only 25 per cent of its leather shoes, and almost no 
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components, from other EU countries. Also, while Asian exporters have generally 
won market share in the EU, they have lost it in Italy to the advantage of less distant 
producers in Eastern Europe and North Africa. A noteworthy feature of Italian 
imports is that leather shoes and components tend to originate in the same source 
countries while in the EU they do not. In sum, Europeans wearing leather footwear 
are still most likely to walk in Italian shoes while Italy increasingly imports leather 
footwear and components from low-cost countries. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In addition, Italy is the EU’s most important supplier of upmarket leather footwear; 
in 2000, 46 per cent of EU imports were Italian. This reflects the country’s traditional 
specialisation in walking shoes made from leather uppers, especially for women; very 
sophisticated internal demand, especially in this segment; and a high export 
specialisation at the high and luxury end of the market (Ragazzi, 1992b). Competitors 
in the EU were either high-value producers with a low market share or had relatively 
high market shares but lower unit values (see Table 4). By contrast, only a third of 
Italian imports of footwear with leather uppers and soles are from other EU countries, 
and they are not in the upmarket category. Thus, Italian producers of upmarket leather 
footwear such as luxury women shoes face much less competition than their 
traditional rivals from France, Germany, or Britain in the EU, and practically none at 
home. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
On the other hand, Italian manufacturers of ordinary leather footwear and especially 
of certain components such as leather uppers are very much exposed to international 
competition, primarily from low-cost locations in Eastern Europe (see Table 5). 
Imports of uppers alone accounted for 55 per cent of all component imports in 2000. 
Thus, the bulk of Italian footwear imports are final goods at the lower end of the 
market and labour-intensive components. By contrast, Italy does not import heels 
whose production is more capital intensive and can therefore be organised efficiently 
even in high-cost environments. Thus, differentiating between products or 
components and market segments shows that some firms from footwear districts do 
face international or global competition. Others continue to dominate their markets. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 lends credence to this interpretation. It shows that Italian firms make use of 
outward processing trade (OPT). This is a regional arrangement that affords firms in 
the EU’s outside periphery more advantageous market access to the Common Market, 
provided they assemble parts and components sourced in the EU. It applies both to 
finished products and to components. In 2000, around three quarters of this trade 
originated in Romania and Albania. In upmarket women shoes, with their generally 
low import levels, OPT accounted for only 17 per cent of respective imports 
(Eurostat). This provides only little, if any, evidence of relocated production activities. 
Furthermore, unit values of final products imported under OPT from Eastern Europe 
were at the low end of those sourced from outside or inside the EU. Thus they do not 
compete against the high-quality and luxury wear in which Italian producers excel. 
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In components, the incidence of OPT is lower the higher the difference between EU 
and East European unit values of the product in question. This is less complicated 
than it sounds. Insofar as the existence of OPT reflects protectionist import regimes, it 
also makes sense. It means that where East European products compete more directly 
with EU goods, market access is more difficult without OPT. In 1996 and 2000 unit 
values of leather uppers were about two times higher in the EU; consequently OPT 
affected 27 per cent of all imports. In in-soles and heel cushions, the ratio of EU to 
East European unit values was 1.25; consequently OPT accounted for almost 80 per 
cent of all imports. By 2000, import unit values were higher than domestic ones and 
the share of OPT dropped to 8 per cent (Eurostat). The dramatic change suggests that 
foreign component manufacturers almost completely replaced their Italian 
competitors. In general, users of price-sensitive imports make most use of OPT 
provisions to get around protection. This is a clear sign of internationalisation. 
Manufacturers of these inputs inside the district are potentially in trouble. Before out-
of-country outsourcing began, their relationship with assemblers benefited from 
externalities and was, while highly competitive, not arms’ length. At least this is what 
the literature on districts claims. They now compete against component manufacturers 
that, despite their much greater distance from the district, entertain non-arms’-length 
relationships, through OPT, with the assemblers. In these instances the scope of the 
districts may have been extended (though primarily in a virtual sense) but its internal 
depth is reduced. In short, cross-border supply chains replace some of those that were 
traditionally local. 
 
 
DELOCALISATION 
 
The differential impacts on firms in footwear districts of international competition 
suggest a typology that captures the nature of this link (see Table 6). It is clear that for 
the time being international competition is not really an issue for traditional producers 
of capital-intensive parts and upmarket final goods. But all other district firms 
struggle in different forms of defensive or offensive adaptation to competition from 
Asia and Eastern Europe. Since footwear is a design-driven business, upstream 
qualification is likely to succeed only in the presence of assemblers who know how to 
turn higher-quality inputs into more upmarket products. It is important to note that 
component suppliers are not entirely in charge of their own destiny because 
assemblers can upgrade and outsource, thus causing a hollowing out of the local 
system. This is indeed one of the scenarios that appears to have played out. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Italy’s major footwear producing areas are concentrated in 19 provinces (Ragazzi, 
1992b, pp.79-84). In the late 1990s they employed more than 80 per cent of the 
workforce in the sector (A.N.C.I., n.d., Table 1.3).1 Each province hosting a footwear 
district was a net exporter of footwear (see Table 7). Trade surpluses existed in final 
products but not always in raw materials and components. Indeed, between the early 
                                                 
1 The analysis below omits Barletta and Casarano in Apulia, and – due to data problems – Varese in 
Lombardy. Barletta specialises in leisure footwear which involves very different production techniques 
from leather shoes and is not the focus of this study. Casarano, another newcomer province to footwear 
production, is not organised as a SME cluster. Nonetheless the sample represents more than 70 per cent 
of employment in the sector. 
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and late 1990s, the most important change in the composition of provincial trade was 
the rise in imports (and exports) of parts – shown above to be often leather uppers 
manufactured in Eastern Europe – followed by raw materials and final goods. The 
growing importance of parts imports and exports suggests two alternative 
explanations. Either parts are imported and, subsequent to processing, re-exported. Or 
some parts are sourced abroad while others are produced at home. The latter is more 
likely because country-level data show that Italy is Europe’s largest importer of 
labour-intensive components, such as leather uppers, as well as its largest exporter of 
capital-intensive components, such as heels (Eurostat). 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Which explanation holds has obvious implications for industrial organisation in the 
local areas concerned. In the former case, the district may come to resemble an 
assembly-only workshop of imported components. In the latter, the impact of outside 
competition would differentiate between more and less labour-intensive producers. 
The district would extend its geographical spread by building up international supply 
chains while narrowing its specialisation at home. Provincial trade data are not 
sufficiently disaggregated to differentiate between parts. But indirect evidence exists 
which shows that some production areas have managed to exploit internationalisation, 
strengthening the district, while others seem to have downgraded in terms of market 
segments and, quite likely, internal cohesion. More about this below. 
 
In sum, local areas became increasingly open to imports at all sections of the value 
chain. All provinces with increased imports of parts also increased their exports of 
final goods, the only exception being Caserta.2 In the case of Ravenna and Padova, 
fewer parts imports are associated with fewer exports of final goods. 
 
With upstream import intensity generally on the rise, is it possible to differentiate 
between the quality of downstream adjustment outcomes? Districts in nine of the 
analysed provinces are generally characterised as upmarket (see Table 8). But exports 
of upmarket footwear rose in only six of these, along with the share of these products 
compared to lesser-quality final products.3 In the remainder, either the share or the 
value of these products, or both, declined. In the provinces with more downmarket 
districts, six increased their exports of and share in shoes with leather uppers, while 
Naples suffered a slight reduction in their relative weight. Hence, increased parts 
imports can – but need not – suit both low-end and high-end producers of leather 
footwear. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
For example, Forlì increased component imports tenfold but all but withdrew from 
exporting leather shoes. The examples of Ravenna and especially Padova likewise 
show that export competitiveness is feasible even without resorting to cross-border 
                                                 
2 Caserta also reduced its imports of raw materials and exports of parts. Together with the increase in 
parts imports, this must spell trouble for local component producers. In fact, more detailed data reveal a 
pronounced increase in the production of leather travel gear in the region without which total exports 
between 1993 and 1998 would have stagnated. 
3 Note that in the case of Treviso “other footwear with rubber or plastic soles” refers to world-class 
skiboots and not to inferior footwear. 
 6
sourcing arrangements. Padova almost doubled its exports of leather-upper footwear 
while reducing its component imports. Thus delocalisation goes hand in hand with 
downmarket adaptations as well as with successful defences of upmarket positions.4 
Either way, this is hardly good news for local component manufacturers who will be 
unable to sustain price competition in the former case and who may be unable to 
sustain product or process upgrades required in the latter case. In sum, districts differ 
both in terms of external links and how they adapt to global changes in relative prices. 
They also differ internally in terms of the consequences increased global competition 
has on firms along the value chain (cf. Rabellotti and Schmitz, 1999). Some react to 
increased competition with outsourcing and appear to be quite successful at turning 
cross-border supply chains into a strategic advantage. 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The world changes, and so do industrial districts. This sounds, and indeed is, a banal 
assertion. The motives behind the change are primarily economic. They reflect 
strategies of firms, in this case mostly of final footwear assemblers, to cope with 
increased competition by substituting one set of close-by subcontractors through 
others that deliver qualitatively satisfactory components at lower cost from a distance. 
True believers might get taken away by this and be tempted to theorise about the 
cross-border extensions of local production systems, or Il distretto alla conquista del 
mondo. This would amount to standing agglomeration on its head. In addition, it 
would continue a harmful tradition of conceptual overkill at the expense of empirical 
verification in much of the writing on districts. But it is the latter that is most needed. 
 
For example, not only is increased openness clearly no sure-fire recipe for the 
maintenance of district performance, let alone upgrading. It is pretty certain that 
assemblers that outsource an important – because design-intensive – part of their 
product possess the requisite organisational capabilities and have access to logistic 
resources that allow them to control a non-local value chain. But it is not clear if and 
how this is related to more or less important brands or, in other words, if active 
internationalisation by the assemblers is limited to relatively upmarket, high-margin 
or to high-volume producers. It is further unclear what exactly drives supplier 
substitution. One might surmise that it depends on the nature of supplier-assembler 
externalities. If they are merely operational as opposed to knowledge-based, supplier 
substitution would appear more likely. Because trade data do not really capture the 
difference between, for example, a simple and a complex upper, the design of such 
analyses is a complex feat. It would also require the availability of data at the 
municipal level concerning, inter alia, firm and employment turnover and value 
added. 
 
 Local and regional industrial policy would benefit from more empirical analyses, 
too. How exactly districts relate to their neighbouring environment is a case in point. 
For example, the share of footwear made from leather uppers declined from over four 
fifths to under two thirds in the 1990s (A.N.C.I., n.d., Ragazzi 1992a). Output thus 
moved away from Italy’s traditional specialisation at least partially into market 
                                                 
4 It is noteworthy that the export decline in total final goods experienced by Padova, Caserta, and 
Ravenna (see Table 7) was not due to import-intensive leather footwear, but to retrenchments in lesser-
quality shoes. 
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segments with lower value added. Indeed, most Italian producers compete against 
exporters from the NICs at the lower and medium end of footwear production. It 
would obviously be desirable to bolster high-end production in particular and to 
sustain exports in footwear made from leather uppers in general. The data analysed in 
this paper suggest that districts may play different roles in achieving this aim. 
 
 For example, both San Mauro Pascoli in Forlì and Vigevano in Pavia are successful 
high-end districts. But marked differences exist in how the footwear sector in the two 
provinces reacted to increased competition (see Table 8). In Forlì, adaptation was 
defensive; the largest export increases were in shoes with synthetic uppers, while 
exports of shoes made from leather uppers declined drastically. Hence, the province 
hosts firms in San Mauro Pascoli that operate in their product niche of luxury 
women’s shoes in splendid isolation (Ervet, 1995) in an otherwise downgraded 
environment. By contrast, in Pavia structural change happened in favour of footwear 
made from leather uppers and away from lower value added exports. It is not clear 
that Pavia’s positive performance was due to the interaction between the Vigevano 
district and surrounding footwear manufacturers. What is clear is that San Mauro 
Pascoli had no such effect on other producers in Forlì. Hence, an industrial policy 
focused exclusively on districts may on occasion miss the wood for the trees. 
 
 In sum, piecemeal and indirect evidence suggests that, in the absence of global 
competition, firms in industrial districts can afford not to change. With increased 
competition, they adapt either aggressively by raising quality levels while containing 
costs, or defensively by shifting downward into lower-quality segments, or by exiting. 
The creation of international supply chains helps both offensive and defensive 
strategies. The data showed unambiguously that international sourcing increased 
which is one of the reasons behind the size reduction, in terms of production units and 
employees, of the footwear sector (cf. Mariotti and Piscitello, 1997). The 
consolidation of the sector especially affects artisan producers and generally raises 
firm size (A.N.C.I., n.d.). Hence, the sector is changing, and the local production areas 
with it. What the data could not show is what happens to local subcontractors. Do they 
exit, sweat-shop, or upgrade? It also did not show how offensive or defensive 
adaptation strategies impact other local footwear manufacturers that lie outside, but in 
the vicinity of, the district. In part, this is a data problem. For example, at the 
provincial level, imports of parts and components are not further disaggregated. It is 
also a problem of how to assess agreements, joint ventures, outsourcing and the like in 
terms of their impact both on traditional forms of local industrial organisation and on 
the individual and collective export performance of local production systems. 
However, this requires a systematic appraisal of firm-level data which would first 
need to be gathered. Unfortunately, this has been outside the scope of this study. 
Unfortunately, because only firm-level data will allow to judge under what 
circumstances the increase of international flows in a production system are 
reconcilable with territorial concentration. My hunch is that answers will differ even 
when comparing areas competing in similar segments such as Vigevano and San 
Mauro Pascoli. In some contexts, tradition qua isolation may continue to be feasible. 
In most others this would hardly appear to be an option. 
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Table 1. – Weight of provincial footwear production agglomeration in regional 
economies, numbers of firms and employees, 1996, in % 
Region 
Province (industrial district)
Share of 
firms 
Share of 
employees
 
Lombardia 
  
Pavia (Vigevano) 38 39
Veneto  
Verona 31 27
Venezia/Padova (Riviera del Brenta) 35 34
Treviso (Montebelluna) 27 34
Emilia Romagna  
Bologna 13 20
Forlì (San Mauro Pascoli) 42 46
Ravenna (Fusignano) 36 24
Le Marche  
Ascoli Piceno 68 61
Macerata 28 33
Toscana  
Firenze 15 22
Pistoia 19 16
Pisa 29 29
Lucca 24 19
Campania  
Napoli 64 69
Caserta 25 19
Source: Data elaborated from A.N.C.I. (n.d., Table 1.3) 
Note: The name of the district is given for illustrative purposes only. Provincial firm 
counts and employment data are the most disaggregate information available. Hence, 
the respective figures at the district level must be somewhat lower. 
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Table 2. – Footwear imports to EU (values), in % 
 1976 1980 1985 1990 2000
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Intra-EU (15) 81.2 77.7 74.7 64.6 52.8
of which: Italy 47.6 45.5 42.5 33.0 16.8
Latin America 1.5 2.1 1.5 2.2 1.2
Asia 8.8 11.6 12.9 20.6 29.4
Africa 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.3 2.6
CEEC 5.9 5.1 6.7 5.9 11.6
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Columns do not sum to 100 because of the absence of non-EU high-income 
footwear exporters (e.g. US). 
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Table 3. – Imports of footwear with leather uppers and 
of components (values), in % 
 1990 2000 
 Footwear Components Footwear Components 
 EU Italy EU Italy EU Italy EU Italy 
    
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Intra-
EU 
73.3 49.4 43.2 16.8 60.5 25.5 24.8 5.4
Italy 39.2 n.a. 14.2 n.a. 20.6 n.a 8.7 n.a.
LA 3.0 1.1 5.9 .. 1.6 0.2 3.1 ..
Asia 12.5 25.0 19.3 25.1 23.0 15.9 19.7 9.4
Africa 0.8 3.8 6.9 2.9 2.6 9.9 9.7 10.1
CEEC 5.4 10.8 19.5 46.7 10.1 45.8 40.0 72.9
Source: Eurostat 
Note: (n.a. = not applicable), (.. = not available because of extremely low value). 
Columns do not sum to 100 because of the absence of non-EU high-income footwear 
exporters (e.g. US). 
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Table 4. – Imports of upmarket women’s shoes (values) in 2000, in % 
 EU Italy 
 Market share Unit value Market share Unit value
 
World 100.0 .. 100.0 ..
Intra-EU 88.4 55.5 19.4 27.7
Italy 51.8 62.1 n.a. n.a.
Portugal 6.9 27.7 .. ..
Spain 18.9 50.6 10.6 32.0
Germany 3.0 91.1 0.5 7.6
France 2.5 124.7 0.7 8.3
Netherlands 2.0 88.3 0.7 25.8
UK 1.5 156.6 0.7 33.1
CEEC .. .. 62.8 12.1
Source: Eurostat 
Note: (.. = not available because of extremely low value). Nomenclature of the 
product in question is CN 64035999. Unit values are obtained by dividing € import 
values by import volumes. 
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Table 5. – Italian imports of leather uppers in 2000, in € ‘000 
 Total Unit value OPT Unit value OPT/Total
EU 7696 45.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
   
Morocco 599 30.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tunisia 57582 37.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
      
CEEC 440850 19.0 120496 13.7 27.3
Albania 39058 9.4 38298 9.3 98.1
Poland 16384 50.6 .. .. ..
Romania 238860 20.4 61356 15.8 25.7
Bulgaria 48460 24.1 8873 19.5 18.3
Hungary 37500 35.7 .. .. ..
Slovakia 14792 24.4 1302 15.1 8.8
Czech R. 7270 21.4 908 23.9 12.5
Bosnia 15924 34.7 678 28.3 4.3
Hungary 7270 21.4 2596 68.3 35.7
Macedonia 1086 25.3 .. .. ..
Serb.&Mont. 10307 31.6 6485 32.8 62.9
Slovenia 3253 19.5 .. .. ..
    
Source: Eurostat 
Note: (.. = not available because of extremely low value). Nomenclature of the 
product in question is CN 64061011. 
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Table 6. – Differential effects of import competition on district firms 
 
Stage of production Effect Possible firm responses Likely district outcomes 
    
Parts/components 
    
  
   
   
   
capital-intensive none (small) 
 
none no change 
labour-intensive large (1) upgrade (1) upstream (“push”) qualification ? upward trajectory of district model 
  (2) downgrade (2) sweatshop ? district becomes unattractive model 
  (3) inertia (3) suppliers exit ? district loses local depth 
 
Final products 
 
low/medium-range large (1) upgrade (1) downstream (“pull”) qualification ? upward trajectory of district model 
  (2) downgrade (2) regress into cheap products ? district loses traditional focus and viability 
  (3) outsource parts (3) broadening of supplier base ? district loses local depth 
  (4) inertia (4) assemblers exit ? district fragments 
high-range none (small) 
 
none no change 
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Table 7. – Imports and Exports of Footwear at Provincial Level in 1990s, LIT million 
 PROVINCE     PRODUCT
GROUP 
IMPORTS EXPORTS TRADE BALANCES
 1993 1998 Trend 1993 1998 Trend 1993 1998
  mLIT % Share 
 
mLIT Share (% Change) 
 
mLIT Share mLIT Share (% Change)
 
mLIT mLIT
Caserta Raw materials 1,031 72.5 603 34.1 -41.5 239 2.4 905 6.8 278.7 -792 302
 Final products
 
             
             
              
              
             
             
             
            
            
             
             
             
            
            
             
             
             
            
            
             
             
             
              
              
             
             
             
          
          
             
            
             
        
        
              
             
             
        
        
357 25.1 695 39.3 94.7 9,721 97.3 5,093 38.4 -47.6 9,364 4,398
Parts 34 2.4 140 7.9 311.8 30 0.3 .. .. 0.0 -4 -140
TOTAL 1,422 1,768 24.3 9,990 13,250 32.6 8,568 11,482
Napoli Raw materials 18,571 64.5 14,462 30.0 -22.1 9,740 15.0 24,936 18.6 156.0 -8,831 10,474
 Final products
 
8,544 29.7 28,436 58.9 232.8 52,073 80.1 100,233 74.8 92.5 43,529 71,797
Parts 152 0.5 298 0.6 96.1 32 .0 371 0.3 1059.4 -120 73
TOTAL 28,804
 
48,276 67.6 64,975  134,008
 
106.2 36,171 85,732
Bologna Raw materials 731 2.2 3,984 20.5 445.0 4,499 4.8 7,832 6.9 74.1 3,768 3,848
 Final products
 
32,405 97.6 14,430 74.2 -55.5 87,397 93.3 100,440 88.6 14.9 54,992 86,010
Parts 49 0.1 187 1.0 281.6 1,621 1.7 3,570 3.1 120.2 1,572 3,383
TOTAL 33,217
 
19,443 -41.5 93,627  113,384
 
21.1 60,410 93,941
Forlì Raw materials 5,818 51.1 7,168 37.2 23.2 1,637 2.3 1,520 1.4 -7.1 -4,181 -5,648
 Final products
 
4,788 42.1 4,318 22.4 -9.8 63,552 89.2 102,200 92.8 60.8 58,764 97,882
Parts 709 6.2 7,677 39.8 982.8 5,969 8.4 6,394 5.8 7.1 5,260 -1,283
TOTAL 11,379
 
19,278 69.4 71,225  110,114
 
54.6 59,846 90,836
Ravenna Raw materials 139 1.9 0 0 -100.0 1,404 2.1 2,481 3.9 76.7 1,265 2,481
 Final products
 
5,601 75.1 8,303 94.0 48.2 65,673 96.8 61,314 95.4 -6.6 60,072 53,011
Parts 1,722 23.1 532 6.0 -69.1 781 1.2 462 .7 -40.8 -941 -70
TOTAL 7,462 8,835 18.4 67,858 64,257 -5.3 60,396 55,422
Pavia Raw materials 3,562 13.6 5,853 12.1 64.3 5,396 4.3 13,105 7.6 142.9 1,834 7,252
 Final products
 
22,492 85.8 41,540 85.9 84.7 114,878 92.0 152,199 88.4 32.5 92,386 110,659
Parts 155 0.6 987 2.0 536.8 4,550 3.6 6,782 3.9 49.1 4,395 5,795
TOTAL 26,209
 
48,380 84.6 124,824
 
 172,211
 
38.0 98,615 123,831
 
Asc. Piceno Raw materials 33,892 43.3 68,975 51.2 103.5 10,125 1.5 19,505 21.8 92.6 -23,767 -49,470
 Final products
 
25,373 32.4 36,576 27.1 44.2 647,366 95.5 1,011,852 92.0 56.3 621,993 975,276
Parts 19,068 24.3 28,828 21.4 51.2 20,343 3.0 68,160 6.2 235.1 1,275 39,332
TOTAL 78,360
 
 134,797
 
72.0 678,053
 
 1,100,379
 
62.3 599,693
 
 965,582
 
Macerata Raw materials 12,885 42.2 29,034 28.7 125.3 8,892 1.9 3,673 0.5 -58.7 -3,993 -25,361
 Final products
 
13,535 44.3 60,936 60.2 350.2 387,924 85.0 588,226 80.6 51.6 374,389 527,290
Parts 3,754 12.3 10,689 10.6 184.7 55,698 12.2 128,311 17.6 130.4 51,944 117,622
TOTAL
 
 30,526  101,139
 
231.3 456,185
 
 730,241
 
60.1 425,659
 
 629,102
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PROVINCE PRODUCT 
GROUP 
IMPORTS EXPORTS TRADE BALANCES 
  1993 1998 Trend 1993 1998 Trend 1993 1998 
  mLIT % Share mLIT Share (% Change) mLIT Share mLIT Share (% Change) mLIT mLIT 
             Firenze Raw materials 41,327 43.6 49,697 37.6 20.3 48,252 8.7 49,546 6.1 2.7 6,925 -151
 Final products
 
             
             
        
        
              
             
             
        
         
            
            
             
        
        
             
             
             
        
        
             
             
             
         
         
             
           
           
        
        
             
             
             
          
          
             
             
             
        
        
51,405 54.2 55,122 41.7 7.2 479,096 86.1 644,130 78.9 34.4 427,691 589,008
Parts 962 1.0 3,411 2.6 254.6 2,526 0.5 35,114 4.3 1290.1 1,564 31,703
TOTAL 94,880
 
 132,294
 
39.4 556,368
 
 816,841
 
46.8 461,488
 
 684,547
 
Lucca Raw materials 402 1.4 2,509 4.1 524.1 3,723 0.7 4,701 0.9 26.3 3,321 2,192
 Final products
 
28,654 98.5 54,463 88.4 90.1 413,959 98.9 520,745 97.3 25.8 385,305 466,282
Parts 25 0.1 4,563 7.4 18,152.0
 
822 0.2 9,234 1.7 1023.4 797 4,671
TOTAL 29,081
 
61,587 111.8 418,504
 
 535,038
 
27.8 389,423
 
 473,451
 
Pisa Raw materials 264,033
 
98.2 285,787 95.8 8.2 394,519 65.2 389,428 54.0 -1.3 130,486 103,641
 Final products
 
4,429 1.6 10,498 3.5 137.0 202,352 33.5 319,584 44.3 57.9 197,923 309,086
Parts 350 0.1 1,852 0.6 429.1 7,790 1.3 10,012 1.4 28.5 7,440 8,160
TOTAL 268,812
 
 298,297
 
11.0 604,661
 
 721,724
 
19.4 335,849
 
 423,427
 
Pistoia Raw materials 9,811 24.7 29,246 28.3 198.1 4,637 2.5 8,942 2.8 92.8 -5,174 -20,304
 Final products
 
28,384 71.6 69,866 67.5 146.1 181,448 96.4 303,942 94.8 67.5 153,064 234,076
Parts 1,467 3.7 4,272 4.1 191.2 2,193 1.2 7,409 2.3 237.8 726 3,137
TOTAL 39,662
 
 103,462
 
160.9 188,278
 
 320,594
 
70.3 148,616
 
 217,132
 
Padova Raw materials 5,225 10.6 9,086 13.8 73.9 7,925 3.2 9,428 4.5 19.0 2,700 342
 Final products
 
39,423 80.2 53,579 81.4 35.9 227,404 92.9 186,784 88.8 -17.9 187,981 133,205
Parts 4,537 9.2 3,157 4.8 -30.4 9,404 3.8 14,108 6.7 50.0 4,867 10,951
TOTAL 49,185
 
65,822 33.8 244,733
 
 210,320
 
-14.1 195,548
 
 144,498
 
Treviso Raw materials 5,733 3.4 11,528 3.9 101.1 5,739 0.7 3,539 0.3 -38.3 6 -7,989
 Final products
 
 153,981
 
91.0 241,595 81.1 56.9 748,657 97.3 1,042,574
 
93.6 39.3 594,676 800,979
Parts 9,472 5.6 44,918 15.1 374.2 15,045 2.0 67,878 6.1 351.2 5,573 22,960
TOTAL 169,210
 
 298,041
 
76.1 769,483
 
 1,114,015
 
44.8 600,273
 
 815,974
 
Venezia Raw materials 937 20.6 5,768 36.7 515.6 167 0.1 3,377 1.3 1922.2 -770 -2,391
 Final products
 
3,156 69.5 8,412 53.6 166.5 178,260 98.1 239,474 95.1 34.3 175,104 231,062
Parts 445 9.8 1,524 9.7 242.5 3,169 1.7 9,080 3.6 186.5 2,724 7,556
TOTAL 4,538 15,704 246.1 181,656
 
 251,931
 
38.7 177,118
 
 236,227
 
Verona Raw materials 58,103 38.7 77,947 36.1 34.2 32,874 5.1 41,652 4.4 26.7 -25,229 -36,295
 Final products
 
85,065 56.7 109,144 50.6 28.3 592,939 92.4 885,750 92.7 49.4 507,874 776,606
Parts 6,588 4.4 27,974 13.0 324.6 15,442 2.4 27,589 2.9 78.7 8,854 -385
TOTAL 150,017
 
 215,857
 
43.9 641,394
 
 955,410
 
49.0 491,377
 
 739,553
 
Source: UIC, author’s calculations 
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Table 8. – Final products: export composition, %share and change 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Province             
         
1993 1998 ∆ 1993
 
1998
 
∆ 1993
 
1998
 
∆ 1993 1998
 
∆ 1993
 
1998 ∆ 1993
 
1998
 
∆ 
 
High-end, stable 
Bologna 9                  
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
            
                 
                   
                
              
                
                  
                    
                   
                  
                   
               
                  
                
7 -10.4 6 5 -6.1 82 85 19.1 2 2 19.5 1 1 17.7 100 100 14.9
Pavia 1 1 -8.3 25 17 -8.0 66 73 46.8 5 2 -53.1 3 7 189.9 100 100 32.5
Pistoia 2 2 64.0 42 40 57.7 50 54 81.2 2 1 -0.9 5 4 36.0 100 100 67.5
Padova 4 3 -43.8 47 18 -68.5 33 77 90.9 15 2 -88.6 1 0 -89.4 100 100 -17.9
Treviso 6 5 6.7 50 55 54.2 27 30 53.8 14 7 -33.5 3 4 64.1 100 100 39.3
Venezia 2 5 326.5
 
54 17 -57.4
 
44 77 135.2
 
0 1 125.6
 
0 0 737.8
 
100 100 34.3
 
High-end, unstable 
 Forlì 17 10 -2.2 45 78 176.1 26 8 -50.5 8 1 -89.0 4 4 47.4 100 100 60.8
Firenze
 
7 4 -14.4 64 75 57.3 25 18 -4.9 3 2 29.5 1 1 125.3
 
100 100 34.4
Pisa 2 3 173.0
 
57 56 56.3 38 30 25.4 0 10 3255.5
 
3 1 -43.9
 
100 100 57.9
 
Low-end, stable 
 Caserta 27 54 4.3 68 37 -71.6 3 9 54.7 2 0 -100.0
 
0 0 0.0 100 100 -52.4
Ravenna 10 7 -35.2 41 35 -20.3 45 52 8.1 2 5 109.0 2 1 -20.1 100 100 -6.6
Ascoli P. 0 0 -10.8 31 18 -6.0 68 81 86.1 0 0 68.3 1 0 -32.4 100 100 56.3
Macerata
 
0 1 409.9 51 27 -19.2 45 69 131.7 0 0 29.6 3 3 27.7 100 100 51.6
Lucca 3 2 23.7 77 62 0.2 14 32 190.7 6 3 -45.5 0 1 719.1 100 100 25.8
Verona 2 5 289.4
 
29 17 -8.7 68 76 65.4 1 1 130.2
 
0 0 68.8 100 100 49.4
 
Low-end, unstable 
 Napoli
 
22 33 184.3
 
46 36 53.1 28 26 80.3 3 4 127.5
 
1 1 72.9 100 100 92.5
Source: UIC data, author’s calculations 
Note: 
(1) waterproof footwear with uppers of rubbers or plastics 
(2) other footwear with rubber or plastic soles 
(3) footwear with rubber/plastic/leather soles and leather uppers 
(4) footwear with rubber/plastic/leather soles and textile uppers 
(5) other footwear 
(6) total footwear (excl. raw materials and parts) 
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